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ABSTRACT In October 2012, the Canadian Heritage Minister announced that the Canadian
Museum of Civilization, the country’s largest and most popular museum, would be renamed
the Canadian Museum of History. In addition to the new name, three strategies—a strategy
of engagement, a strategy of authority, and a strategy of expansion—were elaborated by mu-
seum and government officials as part of the transformation. We examine these three strate-
gies as an example of the Harper government’s attempt to “brand” Canadian identity and
history in its own image, arguing that the strategies were designed expressly to paper over
near-unilateral changes in the museum’s mandate and transformation. Ultimately, these
changes have problematic implications for the democratic management of cultural produc-
tion in Canada.
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RÉSUMÉ En octobre 2012, le Ministère du Patrimoine canadien annonçait que le premier
musée du pays, le Musée Canadien des Civilisations, serait transformé et rebaptisé Musée
Canadien d’Histoire. Il ne s’agissait pas seulement d’un changement de nom mais aussi d’un
changement de stratégie de la part des responsables du musée et du gouvernement. Nous
identifions en particulier trois types de stratégie à l’œuvre : une stratégie d’engagement, une
stratégie d’autorité, et une stratégie d’expansion. A travers l’analyse de ces trois stratégies
nous démontrons qu’elles participent d’une tentative de production  par le gouvernement
Harper d’une « image de marque ». Ces stratégies ont été conçues pour dissimuler la nature
quasi-unilatérale des changements dans le mandat et la transformation du musée. Ces
changements ont des conséquences problématiques pour la gestion démocratique de la
production culturelle au Canada.
MOTS CLÉS Politique du patrimoine; marketing; branding, musées; identité nationale
Introduction
The year 2017 will mark Canada’s sesquicentennial: 150 years since the British colonies
in North America came together to form the Dominion of Canada. The date is eagerly
anticipated by the Harper government, which is planning a series of commemorative
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events.2 These events are contrived, however, to commemorate the Harper government
far more than the nation’s glorious (or inglorious) pasts.
Since the Conservatives came to power in 2006, several cultural institutions have
been pushed into service to articulate the government’s particular conception of
Canadian culture, founded on the twin pillars of monarchism and militarism. The
200th anniversary of the War of 1812, for example, was an opportunity for the Harper
government to reframe the war as a signal moment in Canada’s nation-building project.
A budget of $28 million was earmarked for dramatic re-enactments, public service an-
nouncements, a website and grade school curriculum, and an elaborate exhibit at the
War Museum in the nation’s capital, all aiming to retrospectively situate the war as a
pillar of Canadian identity (GOC, 2012; GOC, 2013). The celebrations were topped off
by a four-day visit to Ottawa by Prince Charles in honour of the Queen’s Diamond
Jubilee and marked with commemorative medals costing the government $7.5 million
(Press & Stechyson, 2012).
In October 2012, then Heritage Minister James Moore announced another project
in the run-up to 2017 that would incorporate this military and monarchical genealogy:
the renaming and renovation of the Canadian Museum of Civilization. Located near
the nation’s capital in Ottawa, the national museum had been one of the country’s
largest and most popular, with approximately 1.3 million visitors each year (Butler,
2012; Ottawa Citizen, 2012). A site of international renown, it was deemed a logical
choice as an instrument to reach Canadians and brand Canada internationally.
The Canadian Museum of Civilization (CMC) was renamed the Canadian Museum
of History (CMH), and along with the name change comes a particular way of selling
history to the Canadian public, one that reflects the Harper government’s broader ef-
forts at information management and control. Many Canadians worry that the new
museum will elide more problematic aspects of Canada’s past in favour of Canadian
“achievements” and “accomplishments”—a Whig version of history (CH, 2012a).
Critics fear that the changes will degrade the museum’s international status and repu-
tation, turning it into little more than an insular “Hall of Fame” (Gardner, 2012).
Further, the museum’s mandate has been reframed, from an international focus to a
concern with “shared national history;” critical research has also been deemphasized
(CH, 2012a).
The narrowed mandate, parliamentary actions, funding re-allocations, and pri-
vate-sector partnerships that surround the museum’s transformation reflect what
Andrew Apter (1999) calls the “subvention of tradition.” It is what happens when the
government underwrites and appropriates the cultural practices associated with a par-
ticular group, putting them to use in the service of its own interests. Our central argu-
ment is that the Harper government is currently inventing its own “brand” of
Canadian identity, employing the Canadian Museum of History as one among several
sites of production for this new national imaginary.
Museums frequently reflect national agendas and are used as tools to shape na-
tional identity (Hinsley, 1981; Kaplan, 1994). The CMC has been no exception. Delaney
(1992) described the CMC as “a site of consumption of a prescribed national identity”
(p. 136). Mackey (2002) argues that a narrative of national progress was forwarded in
the CMC through the appropriation of Aboriginal peoples and myths of harmonious
cultural pluralism. The CMC/CMH rebranding goes beyond identity construction to
encode new norms for cultural institutions. We closely examine the effort placed on
strategic campaigns around the museum claiming to include citizens and specific stake-
holders in a democratic process. While these campaigns appear to encourage public
participation and consultation about important changes that will ostensibly shape the
museum, the agenda of conservative politicians was already being implemented prior
to consultation. The initial lack of consultation about major changes is significant, par-
ticularly as it follows a period where collaboration has become standard practice in
various political realms, especially where Aboriginal people and other marginalized
populations are concerned (McCall, 2011). Moreover, the centrality of military and
monarchical legacies to the Harper government’s vision of national identity, as well as
its embrace of a “Great Man/Great Deeds” vision of history, are clear in recent joint
initiatives between the War Museum and the CMC. The reversion to museological prac-
tices that deemphasize consultation and minimize critique of the government while
relying on big-H history appears to be a direct backlash against so-called liberal ways
of interpreting the past, which challenge historical oppression and de-centre grand
narratives. As Yves Frenette (2014) suggests, 
Harper’s efforts to reconstruct collective memory intersects with a histori-
ographical debate that has gone on for fifteen years. It began in 1998 with
the publication of retired York University historian Jack Granatstein’s sear-
ing and influential book, Who Killed Canadian History?, which, among
other things, accused university history departments of abandoning po-
litical and military history in favour of narrowly specialized studies of so-
cial history of little interest to the general public. Granatstein holds social
historians partially responsible for Canadians’ lack of historical conscious-
ness and claims that they unduly emphasized the country’s injustices over
its accomplishments. (p. 13)
Not surprisingly, our access-to-information request yielded documents listing
Granatstein (also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada) as a member of the General
Advisory Committee to the Canadian History Hall (CMH, n.d.a). Similarly, McKay and
Swift (2012) describe the movement as an effort to position Canada as a “Warrior
Nation” focused on war and soldiers.
Against this backdrop, we examine three strategies undertaken by the museum
in conjunction with government officials to transform and “rebrand” the museum: a
strategy of engagement; a strategy of authority; and a strategy of expansion. Our goal
is to demonstrate how branding works in practice; that is, how the Harper govern-
ment’s fundamental objective is to create new and positive associations among the
party, Canadian cultural production, and Canadian identity.
While the study of cultural and creative production has recently tended toward
issues of labour (Mayer, Banks, & Thorton Caldwell, 2009; McKinlay & Smith, 2009),
we examine the politics of production, seeking to understand how political actors them-
selves influence culture through tactics of control, persuasion and incentivization. This
is not to say that museum officials, practitioners, and consultants are powerless against
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political elites; but their ability to act is often circumscribed by constraints like funding
or revised institutional mandates.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by defining what we mean by “branding”
in the context of this argument (“Defining terms”). We then provide some background
to the museum rebranding initiative, focusing first on the general branding tactics of
the sitting Conservative government (“Branding the ‘Harper government’”), then on
the government’s announcement and stated intentions of the CMC/CMH transition
(“Politics and changes at the CMC”). We next proceed to the analysis, documenting
in detail the three branding strategies—engagement, authority, and expansion—and
delving into their implications for the politics of cultural production in Canada. We
name the three branding strategies “Creating a culture of connectivity” (Engagement);
“Installations of authority” (Authority); and “Discipline at a distance” (Expansion).
The conclusion offers further analysis and summarizes the key findings.
Defining terms
Branding can be defined as the strategic production and articulation of an image of a
commodity, service, institution or other entity. By “strategic” we mean that the insti-
gator of the branding (in this case, the Harper government) aims to create and control
the image in order to accrue economic and cultural value for purposes of self-advan-
tage. Such value can be amassed in a number of ways, but the primary means of value
accumulation in a branding paradigm is to establish positive cognitive associations
and equivalencies between the good or service (or institution) and cultural values, be-
haviours, and attitudes. These associations, or relationships, are then monetized in
different ways, as in legal protection and propertization (Coombe, 1998); the regulation
of tastes and preferences through status hierarchies (Podolny, 2008); and the monop-
olization of asset recognition (Lury & Moor, 2010), rendering cultural value into eco-
nomic value.
Importantly, branding is not about identifying a fixed set of characteristics (e.g., a
logo, slogan or symbol); rather, it is about recognizing a dynamic and contingent con-
textual effect. Following Lury (2004, 2011; see also Aronczyk, 2013), we see brands as
“boundary objects” that shift dynamically to accommodate their circumstances.
Boundary objects are like the operational centre of a Venn diagram; they are, as
Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Starr describe, “both plastic enough to adapt to local
needs and constraints of several parties employing them, yet robust enough to main-
tain a common identity across sites” (quoted in Lury, 2011, p. 53). What this means for
our purposes, and what we argue here, is that the CMC/CMH rebranding is about far
more than the ideological reorganization of the museum to suit the current federal
government’s mandate (though it is evidently about that as well); it is ultimately about
establishing ongoing and robust, yet flexible, connections and patterns of reciprocal
identification among the Harper administration, cultural production, and Canadian
national identity, mediated through the museum site.
Branding the “Harper government”
The CMC/CMH project must be understood in the context of a much broader and long-
range series of image-management initiatives adopted by the Harper leadership since
its ascent to power in 2006. A central arrow in the Conservatives’ image arsenal has
been the reorganization and restriction of government communications, partly through
internal restructuring (including the centralization of internal communications in the
Privy Council Office [PCO] and Prime Minister’s Office [PMO]), and partly through a
vise grip on the Canadian media. Stephen Harper’s relationship with the Canadian
media is notoriously thorny. Press conferences and media events are few in number
and tightly controlled, and national reporters are frequently denied the right to ask
questions (CBC News, 2006). News reports recently revealed that the Harper govern-
ment has paid upwards of $20 million in contracts and subscriptions with media mon-
itoring firms since 2012 (Fekete, 2014). Access-to-information documents revealed that
at the outset of its term in office, the Harper government had even briefly entertained
the notion of building its own press gallery, supervised by the PCO, to supersede the
National Press Theatre. The new gallery would have had limited media access to min-
isters and other government representatives (Crocker, 2007; MacCharles, 2007).
The Harper government has also actively engaged in self-branding initiatives.
Immediately following the 2006 election, several semiotic and visual devices were put
into place, intended to subsume the Government of Canada into the Conservative Party
under Stephen Harper. Examples include redesigning departmental websites to feature
the Conservative Party’s signature blue; promoting a partisan Economic Action Plan
as a “whole of government” project (Canadian Press, 2011); and standardizing the lan-
guage used in internal and public official communication. Shortly after the 2006 elec-
tion, for instance, access-to-information requests by Canadian reporters showed that
federal employees in non-partisan departments, agencies, and Crown corporations had
received memos from the PMO/PCO to use the phrase “Canada’s New Government”
in all communications when referring to the new leadership; this phrase was replaced
by “the Harper government” in 2009 (McGregor, 2013a; Raj, 2012). Stories surfaced of
civil servants being terminated for refusing to use the phrase (Harper’s, 2006).3
In addition to the internal and external controls placed on its communication
with the public, the Harper mandate also appears to encompass the communication
of the public. It is possible to view the Harper administration’s work in terms of a
reimagining of Canadian identity, enacted via a series of regulatory initiatives. These
initiatives, which seek to re-root Canadian foundations in a monarchical and military
past, modulate the symbolic and practical bases of what it means to be Canadian in
the present. Subtle examples began surfacing in 2006, such as the replacement of the
image of the Library and Archives building with one of the Canadian War Museum
on Canada’s savings bonds (Dean, 2013). Perhaps the most explicit of these initiatives
was the implementation in 2009 of a new guide for immigrants to Canada who aspire
to citizenship. Entitled Discover Canada, the guide and the citizenship test give pride
of place to the hereditary Sovereign and to military battles, honours, and iconic figures.
They also centrally reposition conflicts like the War of 1812, even though until recently
it was viewed by historians as a marginal event on the Canadian timeline (Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, 2009).4
If the immediate effect of the Harper government’s subvention of military and
monarchical tradition was to reposition the war more centrally in the public imagina-
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tion, a secondary impact soon became apparent in institutional critiques, which
pointed to the cultural centres damaged by this government-led reallocation of cultural
resources. Massive budget cuts to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),
Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Federal Libraries and Interlibrary Loans, Public
Access, and Archaeology Heritage sites have made clear that existing archives and
repositories are far less important to the Harper agenda than the creation of new sites
of memory and agency.5
Politics and changes at the CMC
Proposed changes to the CMC began with Canadian Heritage and its former minister,
James Moore. Canadian Heritage (CH) is responsible for enacting policies and pro-
grams that deal with the promotion of the arts, cultural industries, and cultural her-
itage in institutions like museums. It also oversees preservation, indemnification, and
the import/export of historical artifacts. CH plays a role in both material and symbolic
forms of culture: both anthems and musical instruments, both cultural holidays and
cultural property (CH, 2010).
In 2008, James Moore was appointed to his position as Heritage Minister by the
Harper government.6 In October 2012, Moore announced a major overhaul of the CMC,
including plans to introduce legislation altering the museum’s mandate and name. A
single (nonrenewable) contribution of $25 million would be provided by CH toward
renovating a 50,500-square-foot area of the museum to transform it into a new
Canadian History exhibit and a space for related temporary exhibits (CH, 2012a).
The opening of the new permanent exhibit, the “largest and most comprehensive
museum exhibition on Canadian history ever developed” (O’Neill, n.d., para. 1) con-
stituting half of the museum’s permanent space, will be a seminal event in the Heritage
Ministry’s commemorations of the Canadian bicentennial and an opportunity for the
Harper government to make a mark on Canadian history that will have long-term im-
plications. It is unlikely that the new exhibit space will be modified for many years
after construction. It is also unlikely that the museum will see another name change
in the foreseeable future.
The CMC is a Crown corporation, and while formally it “operates at arm’s length
from the government,” as outlined by the Museums Act (1990), CH and its minister
clearly had a heavy hand in guiding its future plans. Moore’s central role was highlighted
when he, rather than museum officials, announced the changes at the museum to the
press. His authorial intent was further cemented when, instead of suggesting that the
impetus for the museum’s transformation lay in needs identified by the museum, he
proudly declared that he “came up with the idea of creating the CMH” while on a mo-
torcycle trip through the Okanagan in British Columbia (CH, 2012b; PCM, 2013).
Moore has not been shy about articulating his visions for Canada in the new mu-
seum. For example, he has suggested that he would like to tell history in a way that dis-
tracts from the “cleavages” such as “East-West, North-South, aboriginal-non-(aboriginal),
Anglophone-Francophone, Protestant-Catholic, city versus rural Canadians…” (Moore
as cited in Boswell, 2012, para. 15). Moore suggests that the country must overcome
these divisions “in order to stay united and move forward” (para. 16). Offering potential
signifiers of this unity, Moore proposed the display of iconographic objects like mem-
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orabilia from Terry Fox’s Marathon of Hope; the Last Spike (which completed the
transcontinental railroad); and the jersey worn by hockey legend Maurice “The
Rocket” Richard, objects Moore saw as consistent with an uplifting national myth
about Canadian perseverance in the face of adversity.
As Moore’s plans were unveiled, cutbacks aimed at the CMC, LAC, CBC, and vari-
ous public sector jobs raised eyebrows. Even Conservative constituents questioned
Moore’s expenditures on the new museum.7 Despite critiques about the fiscal irrespon-
sibility of fixing something that was not broken in tough economic times, Moore zeal-
ously moved forward with legislation that would officially enact his visions. 
Creating a culture of connectivity
The museum engaged three non-mutually exclusive domestic constituents about pro-
posed changes: the general (Canadian) public; academics and professional stakehold-
ers; and Aboriginal people. Considered from the point of view of the museum, each
of these constituents was expressly consulted in the museum transition. From a critical
perspective, all three consultations were opaque and partial at best. The consultation
processes, designed to solicit the opinion of diverse stakeholders who would ostensibly
impact the museum’s decision-making, also functioned as a tool of legitimation for
decisions that had already been made. By engaging in consultation and maintaining
the illusion of consensus, museum officials and the Harper government successfully
masked or downplayed deeply consequential changes, like new federal legislation that
alters the purview of the museum.  
Engaging constituents
The My History Museum initiative was a short-term project that ran through the fall and
winter of 2012. At its core were two components: an interactive website (civilization.ca
/myhistorymuseum) and a cross-Canada “tour” of sixteen major cities by museum
officials and public relations consultants to present the contours of the CMC/CMH
transition to the public. The purpose of the My History Museum project was to create
a “culture of connectivity” (van Dijck, 2013) among museum officials, the federal gov-
ernment, and the public. Visitors to the My History Museum website, for instance,
were asked, “What would you put in your national history museum? What stories
would you tell? How would you reach Canadians across the country?” Users were
then presented with an array of options to participate in the creation of their “very
own” museum. A “Public Engagement” survey on the site encouraged users to select
narratives, objects and iconic personalities that they felt should be included in the
new museum, and to “like” different events featured along a timeline of Canadian
history by clicking on them. While the My History Museum project appeared to take
public input seriously, exactly how the concerns of stakeholders will be considered
has yet to be seen.
As the museum began engaging in the public consultation process, concerns over
a lack of expert input on the decision to reorient the museum were raised by a number
of stakeholders, including academics and professionals. The lack of consultation about
the initial decision was evidenced by protests from the Canadian Anthropology Society
(CASCA), the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), the Canadian
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Historical Association (CHA), and the Canadian Archaeological Association (CAA)
(PCM, 2013; CASCA, 2012; Turk, 2012). 
While CH did not consult widely about initial plans, in the wake of criticism about
the unilateral decision to proceed, the museum began inviting select academics to par-
ticipate in advisory committees informing museum content. In addition, academics as
well as industry and creative professionals consulted through a series of conferences
called “Living Labs.” They were brought into the CMC to do “visioning” exercises for
the new exhibit on Canadian History. Early reports from that process yielded troubling
results. During the wrap-up of an early Living Labs session at the CMC, a question re-
lated to consultation with minority groups was asked of David Morrison, Director of
Research and Content for the Canadian History Hall of the museum. One participant
told us: 
Morrison said he can’t possibly meet with every ethnocultural group and
even if he did he couldn’t make them all happy given the constraints in
mounting such an exhibit. He has advisory committees composed of his-
torians, including one with an Aboriginal historian. He doesn’t want to
deal with political organizations, but rather with expert individuals.
Doesn’t have the luxury of time, must tell a national story versus playing
to identity politics. There are an infinite number of things that could be
done, but there will be a national narrative, versus an ethnic mosaic.
As suggested in the excerpt above, early on stakeholders began raising concerns
about a lack of inclusivity, and specifically a lack of Aboriginal consultation. To date,
the museum has not made any public announcements related to Aboriginal consulta-
tion, leaving us with many questions. Why has the museum not been transparent about
what they will do with information gathered during their consultations? The Canadian
History Hall will certainly include Aboriginal histories, but will they serve to build a
broader national narrative? Partial answers came through our access-to-information re-
quest, conversations with consultants to the museum, and email exchanges with mu-
seum staff. However, because the museum has not publically discussed consultation,
many aspects remain opaque to those not immediately involved.
The CMH did attempt to engage in Aboriginal consultation in a few ways. Some
of the early committees included individual scholars who identify as Indigenous
and/or Métis (CMH, n.d.a.). In fall 2013, a separate Aboriginal Advisory Committee
was formed, including seven members who broadly represent different areas of the
country (D. Morrison, Personal communication, 2014a) as well as another new com-
mittee focused on women in Canada’s history. It is notable that both were assembled
several months after the first advisory committees were formed. It appears as though
the museum’s leadership initially did not believe a separate Aboriginal Advisory
Committee was necessary. A secret fact sheet we obtained in the summer of 2013 indi-
cates: “Aboriginal historians and cultural experts will be consulted on a case-by-case
basis, as Aboriginal history is incorporated into the new hall” (CMC, n.d.b., p. 1).
The need for Aboriginal input to inform content in the CMH was emphasized in
a July 2013 report by the consulting firm Lord Cultural Resources, which created and
ran the My History Museum project. It summarized the CMC’s public consultation
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process and findings, reporting that public commentary, both online and at face-to-
face public events, overwhelmingly supported the inclusion of Aboriginal perspectives
in the new Canadian history exhibit. In response to the question, “Whose perspective
would you use to tell the story of Canada?”, for instance, some 250 people indicated
“Aboriginal communities,” more than any other category including “the museum’s ex-
perts” (CMH, 2013).
The museum’s preliminary plans for the CMH also reflected a need for Aboriginal
input. In May 2013, the CMH released a request for tender for creative design that de-
scribed some of the content to appear in the Canadian History Hall (CMC, 2013b;
McGregor, 2013b). The tender clearly indicated the importance of Aboriginal peoples
in Canadian history as well as best practices in contemporary museology. At the same
time, internal documents raised concerns over the schedule of completion: 
While acknowledging this duty, and opportunity [to include Aboriginal
peoples in the narrative and consultation process], we must also keep in
mind the serious time constraints that confront us, with 45,000 square
feet before us and not much more than a year to produce something close
to a detailed scenario. (CMH, n.d.a, p. 1). 
As the document makes clear, expediency is a priority. However, attempts to mesh
Aboriginal perspectives with other national narratives will be a formidable challenge
considering the time and space constraints as well as differences in perspective.
Documents obtained through an access-to-information request alluded to tensions in
terms of competing histories and the museum’s need to combine Aboriginal perspec-
tives with other narratives. That many of the violent legacies of colonization are still a
reality for Aboriginal peoples means that historical narratives can also be political and
contentious. In an email commenting on input from an Aboriginal historian (who was
also a CH employee), Morrison (Personal communication, 2013) commented: 
We asked for 100-word messages; what we have is a long and moving nar-
rative, with way too much detail, and no clear idea of how to prioritize
anything. How do we boil this down into a limited number of main topics
(and hence 100 word messages)? … There is a vast tangle of legal issues
surrounding topics like aboriginal title, unextinguished rights, etc, etc, as
well as detailed histories of legal challenges, and aboriginal organizations,
which seem (to me) to be better dealt with in some forum other than ex-
hibition … (email). 
In light of these competing narratives and agendas, it is not surprising that many
Aboriginal people wish to reorient the museum completely. John Moses (n.d.), a Six
Nations Delaware Band historian, wishes to promote research that:
underscores the need for a fully independent Aboriginal-run yet federally
and industry-financed national Aboriginal cultural centre as a foil to shift-
ing government attitudes concerning the re-presentation of Aboriginal
perspectives in Canadian commemorative events and spaces. (para. 1).
Similarly, an Anishinaabe woman who attended the My History Museum public
consultations opined, “If it were up to me, this new institution would not be the CMH,
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but a museum which attempts to portray an (in)complete history of the land upon
which we all reside” (McKiver, 2012).
We respect the opinions of many of the museum’s staff and members on the var-
ious advisory committees and do believe they extended a good faith effort in guiding
the museum. However, we are skeptical about the lack of transparency, time con-
straints, and competing interests in the museum. Museum officials would not divulge
the names of the Aboriginal Advisory Committee, and could not recall any public dis-
semination of the consultation process (e.g., press releases) (D. Morrison, Personal
communication, 2014b).
As a point of comparison, a consultation committee consisting of Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal members worked for roughly four years to help formulate themes for
the First Peoples Hall in the CMC, opened in 2003. They were not merely included as
an afterthought, but were central in conceptualizing the entire exhibit from its begin-
nings (McCarthy, 2000a; 2000b). The museum was forthcoming about this process,
and former leaders like Bob McGee and Gerald McMaster discussed Aboriginal con-
sultation in interviews years before the exhibit was opened, claiming it was “a neces-
sary part of museum development” (McCarthy, 2000a).
In contrast, new museum leaders left little time for Aboriginal consultation in the
Canadian History Hall as they are working to complete planning and renovations in
only three to four years. As of December 2014, consultation was ongoing, and whether
and how comments will be taken into consideration remains unclear.
Installations of authority
While the museum’s practices related to Aboriginal peoples have shifted, correspon-
ding changes in leadership and legislation have also signalled different managerial ap-
proaches. In this section we investigate legislative and personnel changes, arguing that
they represent a transfer of authority from the museum to the Harper government:
the passing of Bill C-49 and resultant transformations to the museum’s mandate; the
formation of a joint research agenda for the new CMH and the War Museum; and the
changes in staff and leadership at the museum.
Transformations to the museum’s mandate: Bill C-49
In November 2012, Minister Moore introduced Bill C-49 as an amendment to the 1990
Museums Act, which would rename and redefine the museum. The amendment to
Section 8 introduced by Moore also reflected a much more nation-centric history and
audience, de-emphasizing the international reach and focus of the institution as well
as removing the words “research” and “critical” (Bill C-49, 2012).
A parliamentary committee was formed to review the proposed changes. In a June
2013 meeting, a number of critics, including former CMC President and CEO Victor
Rabinovitch and CAUT Executive Director James Turk, emphasized that the removal
of the words “developing for research and posterity” was a signal that the museum
would see a shift from knowledge production, or research, to knowledge display.
Rabinovitch argued that the mandate changes would determine how the institution
should allocate resources (PCM, 2013).
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Moreover, critics noted the unprecedented ways in which CH was attempting to
intervene in the operations of the museum and the lack of transparency demonstrated
in decisions to fundamentally change it. A Parliamentary motion to amend the Bill
(which was denied) suggested that the Bill “represents the government’s interference
in Canadian history and its attacks on research and the federal institutions that pre-
serve and promote history…” and “…was developed in absolute secrecy and without
substantial consultations with experts, First Nations, Inuit and Métis, Canadians and
key regional actors” (Openparliament, 2013).
Despite such compelling critiques, Minister Moore employed salient arguments
in garnering support for his changes. Both critics and supporters agreed that the mu-
seum was in dire need of updating. Moore cited the negative influence of American
cultural products on Canada, leaving Canadians unfamiliar with their own history.
Referring to the 1950s Massey Commission, which suggested that Canada was being
overwhelmed by cultural influences from the south, Moore evoked longstanding anx-
iety in Canada in relation to its national identity (or lack thereof) and cultural sover-
eignty in the face of America’s domineering culture industry (PCM, 2013; Berland,
2009). His argument, a classic red herring, mobilizes fear of American influence in
order to deflect from the real issue at hand: the attempt of one political party to trans-
form the brand of an already successful cultural institution in order to roll it into a
broader partisan communications plan.
In fact, the debate over Bill C-49 has broken down along party lines in a number
of ways, despite Moore’s insistence that it is “beyond partisanship” (PCM, 2013).
Conservative proponents have supported de-emphasizing research at the museum
and in promoting exchange with smaller museums, revealing an anti-intellectual an-
tagonism. Critics argue that the museum does not need to spoon-feed Canadians cel-
ebratory versions of national history (PCM, 2013).
Changes in leadership
In the summer of 2011 Harper’s cabinet appointed Mark O’Neill as President and CEO
of the CMC. O’Neill was the former director general of the War Museum; staff from
the War Museum have also been transferred to the CMC. Even before the passage of
Bill C-49, O’Neill began referring to the museum as though the change had already
taken place, using its proposed new name: “And our vision at the Canadian Museum
of History is to showcase the touchstones—those seminal experiences, personalities,
and objects—that have brought us all here” (O’Neill, n.d., p. 5).
Treating the changes as a done deal indicated O’Neill’s complacence. However, he
also attempted to distance himself as the CMC ostensibly operates at “arm’s length”
from the government. When asked at a parliamentary committee meeting how often
he and the Heritage Minister meet, he responded that they probably saw each other
about once a month at museum functions. When asked how many times they met to
discuss the changes, he replied, “twice” (PCM, 2013). Similarly, while Moore “acknowl-
edges it was his idea to change the museum’s name and mandate,” he insisted that the
law would not allow him to interfere in the museum’s business: “At no time would I,
or could I, ever tell a museum what they can or cannot display” (Butler, 2013). CH also
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suggested that the direction of the museum was consistent with visions set forth by
the CMC Corporation’s Board of Trustees (CH, 2012a).
While CH claimed to be taking cues from the museum’s leadership, it did determine
what kinds of changes would be funded, and Moore had an important say in choosing
decision-makers. It is probably not a coincidence that since Prime Minister Harper took
office, the CMC’s 11-member Corporation Board has seen an increase in appointees who
reflect conservative politics, including former military officers, military defense contrac-
tors, and contributors to the Conservative Party (Table 1). Richard Gwyn, a well-known
historian and political columnist for the Toronto Star, is one of the few appointees to
the board who does not reflect a conservative agenda (CMC, 2013a). 
Table 1: CMC board members
On July 15, 2013, the CMC and the CWM released their first ever ten-year joint re-
search strategy. (The articulation of a joint strategy between the CMC and the CWM
may be telling in and of itself; though both are under the auspices of the CMC
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CMC Board Member Current
role on
Board
Date 
appointed
Previous/current commitments
L. Gen William Leach
(CMC, 2012a)
Chair February
2012
Member of Canadian Forces and
Canadian Army
Worked with defense and technology
service providers Honeywell Canada and
Mincom Australia
James Fleck (CMC,
2012e)
Vice-Chair November
2012
Chairman of NGRAI, a company involved
in the defense industry
Andrea Bonkowicz
(Elections Canada, n.d.)
Member November
2012
Major donor to the Conservative Party of
Canada
Christopher McCreery
(Government of
Canada, 2010; Eye on
the Hill, 2010; CMC,
2012b)
Member April 2012 Involved in the renaming of the Canadian
Navy as the Royal Canadian Navy
Member of the consultation committee
that helped choose the current Governor
General 
Member of advisory committee 
responsible for overseeing War of 1812
celebrations
Claude Thibault (CMC,
2012c; Elections
Canada, n.d.)
Member June 2012 Worked in investment banking and 
corporate finance
Donated $1,000 to the Conservative Party
of Canada four months before he was 
appointed
Corporation.) Conscious of the backlash over the removal of the word “critical” from
the museum’s mandate, a “working definition” of research is elaborated at the outset
of the document:
The Museums consider research the systematic investigation – of sources,
materials, methods, or theories – to create new knowledge and new un-
derstandings in areas of professional interest. This includes the history and
cultural heritage of Canada, and the ways in which such subjects are main-
tained, interpreted, or shared by the Museums in their capacities as public
institutions. (CMC, 2013b, p. 2)
Three themes are identified as central foci for the two museums over the next ten
years: Meaning and Memory; First Peoples; and Compromise and Conflict. Without
seeing how these themes play out, it’s difficult to evaluate what their impact will be
on the understanding of Canadian history. But perhaps the content of this document
is less relevant than the articulation of a single strategy for two formerly separate mu-
seum institutions with separate mandates.
Discipline at a distance
The third strategy for the CMC rebranding is a partnerships strategy, which involves
two specific objectives. One is to solicit funding from private corporate sponsors to
augment funds from the government. The museum has already announced plans to
raise $5 million to “complement” the government’s funds as part of these efforts (PCM,
2013; CMC, 2014).8 The other is to link up the CMC with other Canadian museums,
then indemnify the CMC collection so that its cultural objects can be distributed
among a vast network of other Canadian museums, ensuring that the ideological man-
date governing the CMC/CMH transformation can be implemented through its circu-
lation across the country (CMC, 2012b).
The federal Traveling Exhibitions Indemnification Program has existed since 2000.
It allows for the financial protection of international and national cultural artifacts
when they travel. In the 2012 federal budget, the government doubled funding for the
program from $1.5 billion to $3 billion per year. While collections-sharing was certainly
one of the more popular aspects of Moore’s proposed changes, it again makes strong
recommendations for the kinds of themes and exchanges that will be supported, and
privileges a nation-centric rather than a more outward-looking perspective.
Spokespeople for the Canadian Museums Association (CMA) were especially effusive
about the exchange of objects between the national museum and smaller institutions
(PCM, 2013).
Despite CH pronouncements, there was nothing in the museum’s previous man-
date that prevented updating or linkages with other museums. In fact, the museum
already shared Memoranda of Agreement with over 200 other institutions (PCM, 2013).
Moreover, a single allocation of $25 million both to fund the renovations in the Canada
Hall and to foster linkages with other institutions is inadequate. The museum will
need to take on the burden of raising additional monies to support future linkages en-
couraged by CH, meaning further reliance on the private sector (PCM, 2013). 
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Conclusions
If branding is at base an image-making strategy, it is at the same time a “taking” strategy.
The production of a coherent, cohesive, and profitable image comes only by taking
away the messy work that is inherent to deliberative democracy. It is only by decreasing
the potential for and the value of critique that branding attains its desired effect. As
we have sought to demonstrate, critical perspectives on the CMC/CMH transition were
repeatedly denied, ignored, or subsumed by political actors into a prefabricated vision
of what the transition—and by extension Canadian culture—ought to look like.
Despite the “arm’s length” relationship between the government and the CMC,
the one-time offer of $25 million by CH had strings attached. Museum staff inevitably
maintain some independence, and preliminary plans for the Canadian History Hall
do not completely avoid polemical topics in favour of celebratory nostalgia (CMC,
2013b; McGregor, 2013b). However, the autonomy enjoyed by staff in the past has been
curtailed by shifts in the institution’s funding, mandate, and leadership. The effect ex-
perienced within the museum institution is difficult to measure, as staff have been re-
assigned and laid off over the past two years.
It is through the Harper government’s subvention of the CMC that the traditions
of military history and monarchical legacy are nationalized. The War of 1812 and other
crown moments and military achievements signify an uplifting national mythos and
attempt to establish the distinction and sovereignty of Canada from its neighbour to
the south. Not surprisingly, the Harper government has harnessed the same trope of
American imperialism to call for a renewed focus on big-H history itself by Canadian
citizens—a move that appears even more indefensible in light of the government’s si-
multaneous emphasis on increasing U.S./Canada trade.
The CMH mandate follows more than a century’s worth of museological practices
by which museums were vehicles for forwarding visions of national identity. However,
the CMC/CMH rebrand departs from previous efforts in terms of its overt management
by a single political party, its associated attempts to roll the history addressed in the
museum into broader partisan communications plans, and strategic attempts to foster
a feeling of inclusiveness among diverse Canadian publics while denying their actual
participation. The strategies of engagement, authority, and expansion adopted by the
government and museum officials sought explicitly to connect the Harper agenda
with a “new and improved” version of national identity via the museum site, while
conscientious engagement with stakeholders was de-emphasized—consider, for ex-
ample, the cryptic way in which the museum has treated professional communities
and Aboriginal consultation. This is problematic for those who see museums not just
as political tools, but as “arenas for public engagement, contact zones for the meeting
of diverse viewpoints, and places where authority can be shared” (Dean, 2013, p. 327).
While Minister Moore could not interfere directly in determining what the mu-
seum will and will not display, he did set the agenda for cultural production and steered
the museum’s trajectory for the foreseeable future. In an economic climate in which
cultural institutions are struggling (in part due to government cutbacks), major
changes in the museum will have important implications long after Moore and Harper
have left their positions. Conservative influence on the CMC’s leadership led decision-
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makers to fix a beloved institution that was not broken, despite public outcry about
the changes.
Moore did not need to introduce legislation transforming the museum’s mandate
in order to provide funding for badly needed updates or to encourage exchanges with
other museums. Previous legislation did not preclude such updates or connections.
Moreover, while Moore promoted relationships with other institutions, the $25 million
he supplied was a one-time offer; therefore, the museum will assume the added bur-
den of raising funds from the private sector to continue his initiatives (and so that the
Federal government will not have to provide additional costs incurred as a result of
the changes it introduced).
Moore could have provided funds to the museum without directives on how new
exhibits should be themed. Museum leaders could have been trusted to identify their
own needs independently. Instead, Bill C-49 was a mechanism that allowed the Harper
government to tie the museum in with broader communications plans and to make its
mark on the CMC, the “crown jewel” in the nation’s museum landscape. In the mean-
time, other aspects of the museum are in need of updating, and limited funding has
meant that the institution has been forced to lay off workers (CBC News, 2013). Moreover,
because the new exhibit’s opening has been rolled into the country’s 150th anniversary
celebrations in 2017, expediency has been privileged over good museum practice.
While the museum elicited feedback online and through focus groups with the
general public and academics across the country, exactly how these conversations will
inform museum content is a mystery. The My History Museum campaign was designed
as a way to mediate a polemical transition and to convince participants that the
changes were their idea.
We follow Darin Barney (2007; 2010) in arguing that participation is a crucial part
of democratic life; but that it should be seen as a means, not an object, of citizenship.
The participatory dimensions of interactive websites and roundtable meetings ex-
ploited by the CMC/CMH strategy are poor substitutes for public engagement when
they are essentially post-facto commentaries on previous decisions, rather than inter-
ventions into ideas in formation. These soft participation platforms maintain the illu-
sion of citizen consultation and consensus, while hiding or downplaying consequential
changes. Conversation documents, guides, and online surveys are excellent ways for
cultural producers to gather vital ideas and information about their products pro bono;
however, exhibit designers are not obliged to take all of the advice they receive into
consideration.
Whether the public is convinced by the museum’s feigned attempts at inclusion
is questionable. Letters to the offices of the Prime Minister, Canadian Heritage, and
museum leaders suggest constituents were wise to the fact that the changes had come
from the Harper government’s office as part of a partisan communications plan. It is
probable that the museum will be engaged in defensive strategies to handle the fallout
from Moore’s changes for many years to come.
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Legend
CAA      Canadian Archaeological Association
CASCA Canadian Anthropology Society
CAUT    Canadian Association of University Teachers
CBC       Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CH         (Ministry of) Canadian Heritage
CHA      Canadian Historical Association
CMA     Canadian Museums Association
CMC      Canadian Museum of Civilization
CMH     Canadian Museum of History
CWM    Canadian War Museum
GOC      Government of Canada
LAC       Library and Archives Canada
PCM      Parliamentary Committee Meeting
PCO      Privy Council Office (Canada)
PMO     Prime Minister’s Office (Canada)
Notes
An early version of this article appeared in the online blog Antenna: Responses to Media and Culture.1.
A number of documents cited were obtained through Access to Information requests made to
Canadian Heritage and the Canadian Museum of Civilization. 
In 2009/10, the Prime Minister’s Office insisted that the phrase “Harper government” replace2.
“Government of Canada” in all federal communications (Cheadle, 2011). We deploy this phrase here
to symbolize the Harper government’s message control and ideological irredentism. 
We might also note the recent tendency on Parliament Hill to feature only blue and orange lights3.
(Conservative colours) on the trees during the holiday season, supplanting the traditional white, red
and green. The comedian Rick Mercer has satirized this tendency on his TV show (see Mercer, 2011).
Yves Frenette (2014) notes that two thirds of the illustrations in the 2009 edition of Discover Canada4.
feature war or the military, while the 2005 edition contained not even one such image.
Parks Canada experienced a $29 million budget cut for the fiscal years 2012-2014, and LAC experi-5.
enced a $19 million cut for that same period (Frenette, 2014).
He remained until July 2013, when he was replaced by Minister Shelley Glover.6.
“Rethink,” October 16, 2012, Letter to James Moore from undisclosed recipient, Kanata, Ontario. 7.
In November 2013, the museum announced that it had received funding from the Canadian8.
Association of Petroleum Producers for one million dollars over five years. Not surprisingly, the funding
will go toward exhibits like “1867,” which will “explore how the Dominion of Canada evolved from
the colonies of British North America between 1840 and 1867” (CMC, 2014). The announcement was
met with criticism, some pointing out the disjuncture between the museum’s apparent concern with
Indigenous issues and the legal battles by many Indigenous groups fighting oil production on their
ancestral territories (Slaney, 2014).
Personal communication and irretrievable documents
Canadian Heritage. (April 17, 2013). Appearance of Deputy Minister Jean before the Standing Senate
Committee on National Finance. [Briefing notes]. Ottawa, ON.
Canadian Museum of Civilization. (n.d.a). Canadian History Hall: Members of Advisory Committees.
[Memo]. Ottawa, ON.
Canadian Museum of Civilization. (n.d.b). Fact Sheet: Aboriginal History, 1. Ottawa, ON.
Canadian Museum of History. (n.d.a). Proposal for Aboriginal Consultation: Canadian History Hall
Project, [Internal Document]. Ottawa, ON.
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Morrison, David. (2013, April 2). Aboriginal History in the New Hall, post 1945. [Email to Xavier Gelinas].
Morrison, David. (2014a, December 10). CMH_Aboriginal Consultation. Personal communication.
[Email to Miranda J. Brady].
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